Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections
Chaum, D.
International Association for Cryptologic Research;
This paper appears in: Security & Privacy, IEEE
Publication Date: Jan.-Feb. 2004
Volume: 2,
Issue: 1
On page(s): 38- 47
ISSN: 1540-7993
INSPEC Accession Number: 7867131
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/MSECP.2004.1264852
Current Version Published: 2004-02-19
Abstract
A new kind of receipt sets a far higher standard of security by letting voters verify the election outcome - even if all election computers and records were compromised. The system preserves ballot secrecy, while improving access, robustness, and adjucation, all at lower cost.
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