Random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks
Haowen Chan
Perrig, A.
Song, D.
Carnegie Mellon Univ., PA, USA;
This paper appears in: Security and Privacy, 2003. Proceedings. 2003 Symposium on
Publication Date: 11-14 May 2003
On page(s): 197- 213
ISSN: 1081-6011
ISBN: 0-7695-1940-7
INSPEC Accession Number: 7946297
Current Version Published: 2003-05-21
Abstract
Key establishment in sensor networks is a challenging problem because asymmetric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor nodes, and also because the nodes could be physically compromised by an adversary. We present three new mechanisms for key establishment using the framework of pre-distributing a random set of keys to each node. First, in the q-composite keys scheme, we trade off the unlikeliness of a large-scale network attack in order to significantly strengthen random key predistribution's strength against smaller-scale attacks. Second, in the multipath-reinforcement scheme, we show how to strengthen the security between any two nodes by leveraging the security of other links. Finally, we present the random-pairwise keys scheme, which perfectly preserves the secrecy of the rest of the network when any node is captured, and also enables node-to-node authentication and quorum-based revocation.
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