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Major transmission projects are needed to integrate and to deliver renewable energy (RE) resources. Cost recovery is a serious impediment to transmission investment. A negotiation methodology is developed in this study to guide transmission investment for RE integration. Built on Nash bargaining theory, the methodology models a negotiation between an RE generation company and a transmission company for the cost sharing and recovery of a new transmission line permitting delivery of RE to the grid. Findings from a six-bus test case demonstrate the Pareto efficiency of the approach as well as its fairness, in that it is consistent with one commonly used definition of fairness in cooperative games, the Nash cooperative solution. Hence, the approach could potentially be used as a guideline for RE investors. The study also discusses the possibility of using RE subsidies to steer the negotiated solution towards a system-optimal transmission plan that maximizes total net benefits for all market participants. The findings suggest that RE subsidies can be effectively used to achieve system optimality when RE prices are fixed through bilateral contracts but have limited ability to achieve system optimality when RE prices are determined through locational marginal pricing. This limitation needs to be recognized in the design of RE subsidies.