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An incentive mechanism in smart networks using ascending reverse auction

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2 Author(s)
Sahand Golnarian ; Department of Electrical Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran ; Babak H. Khalaj

In this paper, we use the ascending reverse auction method in incentive-based cooperative networks in order to increase the cooperation level of malicious users. Our approach integrates the reverse auction method with traditional pricing and reputation based algorithms and uses fuzzy thresholds to increase freedom of service providers in making the decision whether to cooperate or not. In contrast with earlier works, we do not concentrate on a specific network or protocol. The simulation results show that while the average welfare of malicious users is decreased dramatically, the average welfare of all users does not decrease significantly.

Published in:

2012 IEEE 23rd International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications - (PIMRC)

Date of Conference:

9-12 Sept. 2012