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Research on profit incentive mechanism of general contractor and subcontractors dynamic alliance in construction project

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5 Author(s)
Hong-lian Yin ; Shandong Water Polytech., Rizhao, China ; Zhi-yi Chen ; Yong-zhen Yang ; Yu-zhuo Sun
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It is the key of possessing stable subcontractors and establishing a long-term cooperative partnership that to design sound profit incentive mechanisms and to win-win with subcontractors for general contractor. In the incentive contract of owner, based on the incentive theory and principal-agency model, profit distributing models of general and subcontractors in one-off and long-term cooperation are set up. The results show that the greater the contributions and the lower the effort costs are, the greater the distribution coefficient is; Pareto equilibrium effort level can't be paid in one-off cooperation, so long-term cooperation should be established between general contractor and subcontractors. A higher distribution coefficient should be given to subcontractor in long-term cooperation than in one-off, the more the cooperation times are, the higher the distribution coefficient is. The conclusions can provide thoughts and scientific basis for the design of the subcontract.

Published in:

Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IE&EM), 2011 IEEE 18Th International Conference on  (Volume:Part 3 )

Date of Conference:

3-5 Sept. 2011