Pricing-based resource allocation in ad-hoc networks using auction theory

This paper adapts a novel dynamic multimedia resource allocation auction-based mechanism for wireless ad-hoc networks. In auction scheme, bidders bid the data which is stored on the server. In this paper, we are assuming that the bidder's bids are based on either a modified first or second-price sealed-bid auction mechanisms, which is accumulated throughout the repeated bidding process over time. The server allocates the data to the winner who values it the most. Both mechanisms have been investigated to prove that they yield to similar utilities in terms of bidders and seller's revenue and overall system efficiency. The simulation scenario focuses on a case where a server node has some data which is offering it for a group of wireless nodes. The server has different forms of multimedia data; graphics, audio and video, we assume that bidders have different interest in the offered data. Some nodes will value the graphics more than the audio, while others value the video more and so on. The introduced mechanism is repeated every time the data have successfully been delivered to the winner. The simulation results prove that the proposed auction mechanism dramatically increases the seller's revenue whether he decide to choose the first or second-price auction. Moreover, the results briefly evaluate the reliability of predefined route with respect to the data prices and source and destination cooperation for different network settings.