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The game balancing of effect of social relief in rural China

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4 Author(s)
Zhangmei Liu ; Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Suzhou Vocational Univ., Suzhou, China ; Feng Xie ; Jianjian Luo ; Qingyuan Zhou

By building a game model about the effect of society relief payment on distribution in rural China and analyzing the private and relief payment (the degree of expecting that society is satisfied), the paper puts forward a optimum distribution scheme of relief fund. It turns out that the optimum scheme is to distinctively distribute the relief payment in graded way according to rich-poor gap. Maximize the effect of relief fund scheme is to gradually diminish the relief payment number with improvement of the people's livelihood.

Published in:

Communication Systems, Networks and Applications (ICCSNA), 2010 Second International Conference on  (Volume:2 )

Date of Conference:

June 29 2010-July 1 2010