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Optimal threshold in the group-buying auction with replenishment postponement

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2 Author(s)
Li Du ; School of Economics & Management, Xidian University, Xian, China ; Jiejian Feng

The group-buying auction is often used in the B2C market. The seller here is offered a quantity-discount-price contract and implements a replenishment postponement policy. We show that when customer's valuation follows a uniform distribution, the group-buying auction does not always outperform the fixed pricing. The optimal group-buying threshold is shown to depend on only purchasing costs, prices and the upper bound of customer's valuation.

Published in:

Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2009. IE&EM '09. 16th International Conference on

Date of Conference:

21-23 Oct. 2009