Referenced Items are not available for this document.
The group-buying auction is often used in the B2C market. The seller here is offered a quantity-discount-price contract and implements a replenishment postponement policy. We show that when customer's valuation follows a uniform distribution, the group-buying auction does not always outperform the fixed pricing. The optimal group-buying threshold is shown to depend on only purchasing costs, prices and the upper bound of customer's valuation.
Published in:
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2009. IE&EM '09. 16th International Conference on
Date of Conference: 21-23 Oct. 2009
- Page(s):
- 181 - 184
- E-ISBN :
- 978-1-4244-3672-9
- Print ISBN:
- 978-1-4244-3671-2
- INSPEC Accession Number:
- 11002495
- Conference Location :
- Beijing
- Digital Object Identifier :
- 10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344609
- Product Type:
- Conference Publications
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