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Efficient auction-based grid reservations using dynamic programming

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2 Author(s)
Andrew Mutz ; Department of Computer Science, University of California Santa Barbara, 93106, U.S.A. ; Rich Wolski

Auction mechanisms have been proposed as a means to efficiently and fairly schedule jobs in high-performance computing environments. The generalized vickrey auction has long been known to produce efficient allocations while exposing users to truth-revealing incentives, but the algorithms used to compute its payments can be computationally intractable. In this paper we present a novel implementation of the generalized vickrey auction that uses dynamic programming to schedule jobs and compute payments in pseudo-polynomial time. Additionally, we have built a version of the PBS scheduler that uses this algorithm to schedule jobs, and in this paper we present the results of our tests using this scheduler.

Published in:

2008 SC - International Conference for High Performance Computing, Networking, Storage and Analysis

Date of Conference:

15-21 Nov. 2008