By Topic

An Auction Mechanism for Channel Access in Vehicle-to-Roadside Communications

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Akkarajitsakul, K. ; Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Univ. of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada ; Hossain, E.

This paper considers a public transportation system, which offers Internet access services to the commuting passengers. Suppose the Internet connection is available at few roadside base stations (RSBs) in a city. Our objective is to solve the bandwidth allocation problem when there are several vehicles connected to an RSB at the same time and the bandwidth of the link to the RSB has to be shared among these vehicles. To solve this bandwidth allocation problem, we propose a game-theoretic model. The main concept of the model is to let each vehicle compete with others in order to obtain the required amount of bandwidth. We formulate this game as an auction game where the vehicles are the bidders and the RSB is the auctioneer. From the performance study, we observe that there is an equilibrium which is a solution in this game. To obtain the solution in a distributed manner, an iterative algorithm is presented.

Published in:

Communications Workshops, 2009. ICC Workshops 2009. IEEE International Conference on

Date of Conference:

14-18 June 2009