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Bargain-based Stimulation Mechanism for Selfish Mobile Nodes in Participatory Sensing Network

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3 Author(s)
Xiaojuan Xie ; Center for Adv. Comput. Studies, Univ. of Louisiana at Lafayette, Lafayette, LA, USA ; Chen, H. ; Wu, H.

This paper focuses on the Participatory Sensing Network (PSN) that consists of selfish participants stimulated by certain reward programs. We propose a bargain-based mechanism to encourage cooperative message trading among the selfish nodes to maximize their rewards. We state the necessary condition for feasible message transactions in a theorem. We model message transaction as a two-person cooperative game, and we apply Nash Theorem to obtain optimal solution which is fair and Pareto optimal. We also present a greedy algorithm to reach the optimal solution. The effectiveness of the bargain-based stimulation mechanism is studied by extensive simulations based on real mobility traces.

Published in:

Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, 2009. SECON '09. 6th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on

Date of Conference:

22-26 June 2009