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Conflicting investment incentives in electricity transmission

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2 Author(s)
Sauma, E. ; Dept. of Ind. Eng. & Oper. Res., California Univ., Berkeley, CA, USA ; Oren, S.S.

This work illustrates the potential existence of conflicting incentives concerning electricity transmission investment. Specifically, we show that even in simple radial networks, different desired optimizing objectives could result in divergent optimal expansions of the transmission network. Consequently, finding a unique network expansion policy could be a very difficult, if not impossible, task.

Published in:

Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2005. IEEE

Date of Conference:

12-16 June 2005