By Topic

An adaptive attitude bidding strategy for agents in continuous double auctions

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Huiye Ma ; Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, Shatin, China ; Ho-fung Leung

Continuous double auction (CDA) is a popular market institution for real-world trading of commodities as well as electronic marketplaces. In this paper, we present the design and analysis of a new strategy for buyer and seller agents participating in agent-based CDAs. We consider a series of CDAs, the participants of which have similar behaviors in any two successive CDAs. These strategies employ heuristic rules and reasoning mechanism based on a two-level adaptive bid-determination method, including long-term and short-term attitudes. Agents adopting these strategies dynamically adjust their behaviors in response to the changes of the supply-demand relation in the market. Experiments show that agents adopting these strategies outperform other strategies reported in the literature.

Published in:

e-Technology, e-Commerce and e-Service, 2005. EEE '05. Proceedings. The 2005 IEEE International Conference on

Date of Conference:

29 March-1 April 2005