By Topic

Risk evasion contract design for distribution utility based on incentives theory

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$33 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

3 Author(s)
Dengwei Duan ; Dept. of Electr. Eng., Sichuan Univ., Chengdu, China ; Junyong Liu ; Jiguang Wu

Distribution utilities are facing enormous risks in market environment. The causes of risks are analyzed and a risk-evasion contract design method is presented based on incentives theory and load management techniques. The contract design is to help the utility evade risks by encouraging customers' to actively apply load management behaviors. Principal-agent model is employed in risk-evasion incentive contract design. The utility's optimal contracts are developed with considering risk-averse and risk-taker customers respectively, the correlation of market price and retail price is also considered in contract design. The simulation results show the feasibility of proposed methods in evasion risks of spot market.

Published in:

Electric Utility Deregulation, Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2004. (DRPT 2004). Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Conference on  (Volume:2 )

Date of Conference:

5-8 April 2004