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Cryptanalysis of security enhancement for the timestamp-based password authentication scheme using smart cards

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3 Author(s)
Chou-Chen Yang ; Dept. of Information Manage., Chaoyang Univ. of Technol., Taiwan ; Hung-Wen Yang ; Ren-Chiun Wang

Recently, Yang and Shieh proposed two password authentication schemes. In 2002, Chan and Cheng pointed out that Yang and Shieh's timestamp-based authentication scheme was vulnerable to the forgery attack. In 2003, Sun and Yeh pointed out that Yang and Shieh's scheme was vulnerable to the forgery attack and explained Chan and Cheng's attack was unreasonable. Later, Shen et al. modified Yang and Shieh's scheme to resist Chan and Cheng's attack. However, in this paper, we shall point out that Shen et al.'s improvement is still vulnerable to the forgery attack.

Published in:

IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics  (Volume:50 ,  Issue: 2 )