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A multi-attribute reverse auction for outsourcing

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2 Author(s)
Mishra, D. ; Dept. of Ind. Eng., Wisconsin Univ., Madison, WI, USA ; Veeramani, D.

In an outsourcing economy, a set of parent-firms want to outsource one component each to one of the suppliers out of a set of suppliers, who each want to supply a maximum of one component. There is a finite set of attributes, each of which can take some finite values, which concern the parent-firms and the suppliers. Parent-firms have valuations for their components and suppliers have costs for supplying the component, both of which depend on the attribute values and are private to the respective parent-firms and suppliers. We propose a reverse auction algorithm for the outsourcing economy. Our reverse auction algorithm achieves nearly efficient allocation and the final prices are also nearly competitive. We investigate strategic behavior of parent-firms and suppliers in our auction.

Published in:

Database and Expert Systems Applications, 2002. Proceedings. 13th International Workshop on

Date of Conference:

2-6 Sept. 2002