By Topic

Penalizing strategic preference manipulation in multi-agent decision making

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

1 Author(s)
Yager, R.R. ; Machine Intelligence Inst., Iona Coll., New Rochelle, NY, USA

We consider the problem of group decision making where the selection process is based upon a group preference function, obtained by an aggregation of the participating agents individual preference functions. We describe some methods for formulating the group preference from the individual preference functions. We note the possibility of the individual agents strategically manipulating the information they provide, so as to further their own goal of getting their most preferred alternative selected by the group. With this in mind, we suggest ways of modifying the formulation of the group decision functions to discourage strategic manipulation by the participating agents

Published in:

Fuzzy Systems, IEEE Transactions on  (Volume:9 ,  Issue: 3 )