By Topic

A voter model of the spatial prisoner's dilemma

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Frean, M.R. ; Sch. of Math. & Comput. Sci., Victoria Univ., Wellington, New Zealand ; Abraham, E.R.

The prisoner's dilemma (PD) involves contests between two players and may naturally be played on a spatial grid using voter model rules. In the model of spatial PD discussed here, the sites of a two-dimensional lattice are occupied by strategies. At each time step, a site is chosen to play a PD game with one of its neighbors. The strategy of the chosen site then invades its neighbor with a probability that is proportional to the payoff from the game. Using results from the analysis of voter models, it is shown that with simple linear strategies, this scenario results in the long-term survival of only one strategy. If three nonlinear strategies have a cyclic dominance relation between one another, then it is possible for relatively cooperative strategies to persist indefinitely. With the voter model dynamics, however, the average level of cooperation decreases with time if mutation of the strategies is included. Spatial effects are not in themselves sufficient to lead to the maintenance of cooperation

Published in:

Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on  (Volume:5 ,  Issue: 2 )