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A study of basic bidding strategy in clearing pricing auctions

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1 Author(s)
Shangyou Hao ; Perot Syst. Corp., UK

This paper models bidding behaviors of suppliers to electricity auction markets under clearing pricing rules and with some suppliers is derived by solving a set of differential equations that specify the necessary conditions for builders to maximize their expected payoffs. The derived result indicates that bidders have incentives to mark up their bid above their costs of production. The amount of markup depends on the probability of winning below and on the margin that are computed from the cost distribution of all suppliers, market demand and the number of suppliers participating in the auction

Published in:

Power Industry Computer Applications, 1999. PICA '99. Proceedings of the 21st 1999 IEEE International Conference

Date of Conference:

Jul 1999