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Recent research has provided evidence indicating how a malicious user could perform coresidence profiling and public-to-private IP mapping to target and exploit customers which share physical resources. The attacks rely on two steps: resource placement on the target's physical machine and extraction. Our proposed solution, in part inspired by mussel self-organization, relies on user account and workload clustering to mitigate coresidence profiling. Users with similar preferences and workload characteristics are mapped to the same cluster. To obfuscate the public-to-private IP map, each cluster is managed and accessed by an account proxy. Each proxy uses one public IP address, which is shared by all clustered users when accessing their instances, and maintains the mapping to private IP addresses. We describe a set of capabilities and attack paths an attacker needs to execute for targeted coresidence, and present arguments to show how our approach disrupts the critical steps in the attack path for most cases. We then perform a risk assessment to determine the likelihood an individual user will be victimized, given that a successful nondirected exploit has occurred. Our results suggest that while possible, this event is highly unlikely.