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Formal security analysis of NFC M-coupon protocols using Casper/FDR

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4 Author(s)
Alshehri, Ali ; Dept. of Computing, University of Surrey Guildford GU2 7XH, England ; Briffa, Johann A. ; Schneider, Steve ; Wesemeyer, Stephan

Near field communication (NFC) is a standard-based, radio frequency (RF), wireless communication technology that allows data to be exchanged between devices that are less than 10 cm apart. NFC security protocols require formal security analysis before massive adoptions, in order to check whether these protocols meet its requirements and goals. In this paper we formally analyse NFC-based mobile coupon protocols using formal methods (Casper/FDR). We find an attack against the advanced protocol, and then we provide a solution that addresses the vulnerability formally.

Published in:

Near Field Communication (NFC), 2013 5th International Workshop on

Date of Conference:

5-5 Feb. 2013

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