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Modified uniform price mechanism design in cognitive radio networks

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4 Author(s)
Xiaoyu Wang ; Sch. of Electron. Eng., Beijing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Beijing, China ; Yuan'an Liu ; Gang Xie ; Panliang Deng

Dynamic spectrum leasing is emerging as a promising technique to improve the utilization of spectrum. Spectrum auction is proved to be an effective method for secondary users (SUs) to lease the idle frequency band. In this article, we investigate the mechanism design of dynamic spectrum leasing based on uniform price auction and focus on the challenges of budget constraints under multi-object auction. Then we propose a modified uniform price mechanism with true-telling property, which can achieve a quick and efficient allocation of the spectrum.

Published in:

Network Infrastructure and Digital Content (IC-NIDC), 2012 3rd IEEE International Conference on

Date of Conference:

21-23 Sept. 2012