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Side-channel resistant AES architecture utilizing randomized composite field representations

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5 Author(s)
Jungk, B. ; Design Inf. Medien, Hochschule Rhein-Main, Wiesbaden, Germany ; Stottinger, M. ; Gampe, J. ; Reith, S.
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In the recent decade methods and applications of side-channel analysis gain more and more attention for industry applications as well as in academia. The research on counter-measures against power analysis attacks on embedded devices with security-sensitive applications turned out to be a challenging area. Very often the proposed countermeasures consume to much resources in order to increase the barrier to hinder a successful attack. The presented scheme uses randomized isomorphisms of the algebraic construction of the S-box and thus increases the resistance at a very low cost in terms of hardware resources. The resource utilization of the proposed masking scheme is smaller than a standard Boolean masking scheme for FPGAs. Our conducted experiments on the FPGA evaluation platform SASEBO GII demonstrates that we improved the resistance against the common DPA attack about 100 times compared to the non-hardened AES-128 version.

Published in:

Field-Programmable Technology (FPT), 2012 International Conference on

Date of Conference:

10-12 Dec. 2012