Referenced Items are not available for this document.
In this paper, we present a two-party key agreement protocol, which is secure in standard model. By using the Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate, we reduce the security of our scheme to Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, and a proof is given. Furthermore, with the consistency of messages exchanged publicly verifiable, our scheme achieves most of the known security attributes.
Published in:
Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS), 2012 Eighth International Conference on
Date of Conference: 17-18 Nov. 2012
- Page(s):
- 636 - 640
- Print ISBN:
- 978-1-4673-4725-9
- INSPEC Accession Number:
- 13235022
- Conference Location :
- Guangzhou
- Digital Object Identifier :
- 10.1109/CIS.2012.147
- Product Type:
- Conference Publications
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