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The Source Identification Game: An Information-Theoretic Perspective

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2 Author(s)
Mauro Barni ; Department of Information Engineering and Mathematical Sciences, University of Siena, Siena, ITALY ; Benedetta Tondi

We introduce a theoretical framework in which to cast the source identification problem. Thanks to the adoption of a game-theoretic approach, the proposed framework permits us to derive the ultimate achievable performance of the forensic analysis in the presence of an adversary aiming at deceiving it. The asymptotic Nash equilibrium of the source identification game is derived under an assumption on the resources on which the forensic analyst may rely. The payoff at the equilibrium is analyzed, deriving the conditions under which a successful forensic analysis is possible and the error exponent of the false-negative error probability in such a case. The difficulty of deriving a closed-form solution for general instances of the game is alleviated by the introduction of an efficient numerical procedure for the derivation of the optimum attacking strategy. The numerical analysis is applied to a case study to show the kind of information it can provide.

Published in:

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security  (Volume:8 ,  Issue: 3 )