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Optimal policies in name-your-own-price auction mechanism with multi-attribute decision

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4 Author(s)
Rong Zhang ; Department of Management Science, Henan Agricultural University, Zhengzhou China 450002 ; Bin Liu ; Shuai Liu ; Xindi Ma

Name-your-own-price (NYOP) is a successful business model for high timeliness commodity. Consumers care not only price of commodity, but also the utility of commodity which much more attributes of commodity offer to consumers in addition to price. The researches on NYOP have studied the optimal game strategies about the buyer and sellers based on the price. Different from the existing literature, a new online multi-attribute reverse auction business model is designed, based on multiple attributes of commodity. The model extends NYOP to the pattern of name-your-own-desire (NYOD). And the optimal policies of buyer and sellers in NYOD are studies. Finally, a case demonstrates feasibility and high efficiency of our model.

Published in:

Computational Intelligence and Cybernetics (CyberneticsCom), 2012 IEEE International Conference on

Date of Conference:

12-14 July 2012