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Cyber attacks on power system state estimation through topology errors

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2 Author(s)
Ashok, A. ; Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Iowa State Univ., Ames, IA, USA ; Govindarasu, M.

The exposure of SCADA network infrastructure to cyber threats has increased enormously due to increased interconnectivity of SCADA and public network infrastructures. The number and complexity of cyber attacks on key power system operational functions like Automatic Generation Control (AGC), State Estimation (SE), and Energy Management Systems (EMS) are increasing everyday. This paper discusses the effect of intentional topology errors created on the power system state estimation function through cyber attacks. The paper provides a method by which an unobservable topology error can be created through a cyber attack. Also, it describes the impact of such an unobservable attack through System Operating Limit (SOL) violations using the IEEE 14 bus power system model.

Published in:

Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2012 IEEE

Date of Conference:

22-26 July 2012