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Finding risk dominance strategy in imperfect game, a theory perspective

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2 Author(s)
Farshchi, S.M.R. ; Dept. of Data Min., Adv. Res. Center, Iran ; Kehvazadeh, I.

Game theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. It is widely used in decision of economic behavior and other game conditions with risk characters. A model is an abstraction we use to understand our observations and experiences. This paper proposes an imperfect information multi-player system using risk dominance strategy for its decision module. In this article, the Influence of the strategy in different conditions is discussed. A model is unlikely to help us understand a phenomenon if its assumptions are wildly at odds with our observations. The cases that risk dominance worked and the process of the module to exclude risk is illustrated. In the end, basing on the results of experiments, the performance of the strategy is discussed.

Published in:

Control (CONTROL), 2012 UKACC International Conference on

Date of Conference:

3-5 Sept. 2012

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