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Fairness and mutual profitability in collective behavior of automata

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1 Author(s)
Yousri M. Abdel-Fattah ; Lab. d'Electronique et d'Etude des Systemes Automatiques, Faculty of Sci., Rabat, Morocco

A certain class of noncooperative games is considered with two pure strategies for each of the automata players. The nature of the game is such that the pay-off of each player increases if any other participant in the game chooses the same pure strategy as that player, and decreases otherwise. The pay-off from a joint strategy is generally different for each automaton so that a joint strategy which is mutually profitable is not generally a fair play. A learning automaton model is proposed so that, without any prior agreement, as time unfolds a group of automata achieve a situation in mixed strategies which yields a pay-off for each automaton that is a trade-off between `fairness' and `profitability'. A formal mathematical proof of convergence of the collective situation in mixed strategies is given. An example is given to demonstrate the theoretical results.

Published in:

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics  (Volume:SMC-13 ,  Issue: 2 )