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Dynamic Game Analysis of Technology Innovation between Government and Enterprise

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2 Author(s)
Shike Ren ; Sch. of Manage., Xi''an Jiaotong Univ., Xian, China ; Zhiping Yuan

Enterprises are the mainstay of technological innovation, and governments are the mainstay of the system innovation. There exist 'adverse selection' in the technical innovation as the information asymmetry between the government and enterprise. At the same time, the information asymmetry also have affect on the Preferential Policy Support. In this paper, we construct the Dynamic Game Model subject to the preferential policy of the technical innovation between the government and the enterprise. We obtain the strategy profile of the both sides sub game perfect Nash equilibrium in the special condition. At last, we analyze the important that the government identify enterprise application and we propose the specific measures to impose the identify effect.

Published in:

Computational Sciences and Optimization (CSO), 2012 Fifth International Joint Conference on

Date of Conference:

23-26 June 2012

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