Skip to Main Content
Underutilisation and scarcity of the available bandwidth have led to the idea of spectrum sharing as primary users partially transfer their rights for spectrum access to others in return for rewards. In this study, we introduce a new distributed game-theoretic approach in order to analyse the dynamic spectrum leasing problem in the uplink side of cellular cognitive radio networks. In such scenarios, it is necessary to define utility functions for primary and secondary users according to their incentives in order to model such interaction properly. We prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium point as well as its uniqueness for our model in the framework of standard power control algorithms and demonstrate fast convergence rate of the proposed method through numerical results. Owing to cellular architecture of the problem, the improvement in power consumption and signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) levels as users are given the opportunity to switch between different base stations is then investigated. Furthermore, we propose a simple admission control scheme and show the resulting performance improvement through simulations. In addition, the proposed framework provides the possibility of investigating trade-offs in terms of various system parameters.