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Object defense strategy with imperfect false targets and disinformation

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3 Author(s)
Rui Peng ; Dongling Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Beijing, China ; Wenbin Wang ; Fei Zhao

This paper considers defending a single object with imperfect false targets and disinformation actions. Existing papers have assumed that the false targets are either perfect or with a constant detection probability. In practice, intelligent attacker may allocate part of its budget into detecting the false targets. Analogously, the defender can allocate part of its budget into disinformation actions in order to prevent the false targets from being detected. In this paper, the detection probability of each false target is assumed to be a function of the intelligence and disinformation efforts allocated on the false target. The optimal resource allocation between target identification/disinformation and attack/protection efforts is studied for the case of constrained defense and attack resources.

Published in:

Quality, Reliability, Risk, Maintenance, and Safety Engineering (ICQR2MSE), 2012 International Conference on

Date of Conference:

15-18 June 2012