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Charging station selection optimization for plug-in electric vehicles: An oligopolistic game-theoretic framework

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2 Author(s)
Escudero-Garzas, J.J. ; Group of Signal Process. for Commun. & Navig. Group (SPCOMNAV), Univ. Autonoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain ; Seco-Granados, G.

In this paper, we describe a framework for the selection of the best charging station when plug-in electric vehicles (PEV) need to recharge their batteries, while at the same time the power utilities, which own the charging stations (CS), optimize their revenue. We use two-way communication to transmit positioning information, which is a key factor so that the plug-in electric vehicles evaluate its required energy. Within this framework, we also describe a procedure that is implemented in a distributed manner and is based on a non-cooperative oligopoly game that makes use of differentiated products theory and conjectural variations to provide a Nash equilibrium in prices and quantities.

Published in:

Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), 2012 IEEE PES

Date of Conference:

16-20 Jan. 2012