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Coevolving Strategies in Social-Elimination Games

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3 Author(s)
Kan-Leung Cheng ; Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA ; Ugur Kuter ; Jennifer Golbeck

Social games provide a framework to study how individuals and groups of individuals interact with each other, and develop strategies to achieve their own well-defined objectives. This paper provides a co evolutionary analysis of how different strategies evolves in a class of social games. We describe a new formalism for modeling a player that is capable of learning and adapting its strategies to act with the other members of its own group and against those of a conflicting group. We define two example player models based on the formalism. We also propose a methodology to compare different player models using co evolution. Our experimental results show that different groups develop, in an alternating fashion, counter-strategies against the other groups over time and the performance a player depends on the player's ability to adapt to its opponent's strategies.

Published in:

Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT) and 2011 IEEE Third Inernational Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom), 2011 IEEE Third International Conference on

Date of Conference:

9-11 Oct. 2011