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Spectrum pricing games with arbitrary bandwidth availability probabilities

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2 Author(s)
Gaurav S. Kasbekar ; Electrical and Systems Engineering Department at University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, U.S.A. ; Saswati Sarkar

We consider price competition among multiple primary users in a cognitive radio network with multiple secondary users. Each primary has unused bandwidth with some probability, possibly different for different primaries, which he would like to lease to a secondary. For the case in which all the primaries and secondaries are in a single location, we explicitly compute a Nash equilibrium (NE) and show its uniqueness. Then we consider the game with spatial reuse of spectrum, and for linear conflict graphs, explicitly compute a NE and show its uniqueness in a natural sub-class of NE.

Published in:

Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2011 IEEE International Symposium on

Date of Conference:

July 31 2011-Aug. 5 2011