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Dual game in state-owned enterprise property right evolution in China

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1 Author(s)
Han Peng ; School of Economics and Management, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo, 454000, China

The privatization reform of state-owned companies has been drawing much attention in the past 30-odd years of reform and opening-up. Based on the complete information dynamic game theory, the present paper introduces three factors to the decision-making function, namely, the knowledge of institution, the acceptability of ideology, and the pressure of unemployment. It attempts to explain the whole course of state-owned companies' property right evolution with endogenous mechanism, and advances that the property right reform of the state-owned enterprise would have an optimistic prospect of all-privatized situation.

Published in:

Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on

Date of Conference:

8-10 Aug. 2011