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Uniform price versus discriminatory auctions in bond markets: A experimental analysis based on multi-agents system

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2 Author(s)
Xiaofeng Liu ; Dept. of Finance, School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin, China ; Hua Cao

The uniform price auction and discriminatory price auction are used in bond issue. Which auction has higher market efficiency is still an unresolved problem. In this paper, we compare the difference between uniform price auction and discriminatory auction with simulated experiments. The results show that the uniform price auction is a better choice in a long term. And discriminatory price auction is efficient as a short-term policy.

Published in:

Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on

Date of Conference:

8-10 Aug. 2011