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Optimizations of contract incentives and duration for construction programme management

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2 Author(s)
Yaohong Yang ; Water Resources Sch., North China Univ. of Water Conservancy & Electr. Power, Zhengzhou, China ; Zhiyong Li

Considering expected operating income, opportunity income, reputation income and others, a Steckelberg decision model was formed from the double viewpoints of the programme owners and multi-contractor. In the model, contract incentives and duration of construction programme were optimized by searching Nash equilibrium. Finally, a case is computed to verify effectiveness of the model.

Published in:

Mechanic Automation and Control Engineering (MACE), 2011 Second International Conference on

Date of Conference:

15-17 July 2011