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Conditional games: A framework for coordination

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1 Author(s)
Wynn Stirling ; Faculty of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Brigham Young University, 105 FPH, Provo, Utah, USA, 84602

Game theory is often proposed as a framework within which to model coordination. Neoclassical game theory, however, focuses exclusively on individual preferences, whereas coordination requires a concept of group preference as well as individual preferences. Conditional game theory differs from classical theory in two fundamental ways. First, it involves a utility structure that permits agents to define their preferences conditioned on the preferences of other agents, and second, it accommodates a notion of group rationality as well as individual rationality. The resulting framework permits a notion of group preferences to be defined, and leads to the development of a metric to characterize the intrinsic ability of the members of a group to coordinate.

Published in:

2011 Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC)

Date of Conference:

23-25 May 2011