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Security Analysis of the Cryptographic Namespace Design in Next Generation Internet Architectures

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2 Author(s)
Oliver Hanka ; Inst. for Commun. Networks, Tech. Univ. Munchen, Munich, Germany ; Julian Lamberty

Many Next Generation Internet architecture proposals introduce a cryptographic namespace to integrate security functionality into the network layer. They suggest to use the hash of a node's public key as its address - the so called self-certifying address. This tight coupling between the public key and the address, however, raises the vulnerability and misleadingly indicates a false sense of security. In this paper we discuss four problematic issues with self-certifying addresses. These are inflexibility in key change, misuse of old keys, problematic authentication and random key guess. In the end we briefly outline a different approach to integrate the private/public key principle with an locator/identifier-split architecture.

Published in:

2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC)

Date of Conference:

5-9 June 2011