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Optimal Resource Pricing Coercing Social Behavior in Wireless Networks

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1 Author(s)
Hanna Bogucka ; Poznan Univ. of Technol., Poznan, Poland

In this paper, we consider an opportunistic access to the spectrum resources in wireless networks. The resources are adopted by the network nodes in a distributed manner, i.e. based on their local channel quality information. The competition of nodes for available resources is modeled as a game. To coerce the desired behavior of the competitors having no information on the other players, pricing (taxation) of resources is applied. We formulate the problem of finding the optimal taxation rate, and propose a reduced-complexity algorithm for this optimization. Simulation results for these optimal values are also provided.

Published in:

2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)

Date of Conference:

5-9 June 2011