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A Case for Multi-service Overlay Multicast Networks Based on Auction Mechanism

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2 Author(s)
Rezvani, M.H. ; Sch. of Comput. Eng., Iran Univ. of Sci. & Technol. IUST, Tehran, Iran ; Analoui, M.

Recently, strategic behavior modeling has attracted much attention of the researchers focusing on designing protocols in the area of overlay multicast networks. The motivation lies in the fact that the overlay peers are selfish in nature and they typically belong to different administrative domains. In this paper, we model the strategic behavior of the selfish peers by leveraging the rich theory of mechanism design using the concept of economic auctions. By considering the bandwidth of the service offered by the origin server as the commodity, we design dynamic auctions in which downstream peers submit their value of bids for each commodity at the upstream peers.

Published in:

Information Technology: New Generations (ITNG), 2011 Eighth International Conference on

Date of Conference:

11-13 April 2011