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Dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising approach to alleviate the spectrum scarcity problem in wireless communications. Hence, it enhances the flexibility and, as a result, the efficiency of spectrum usage. In this paper, we address the problem of spectrum sharing in the secondary spectrum market involving multiple primary and secondary strategic users. In this scenario, primary users (PUs) are willing to offer part of their spectrum to secondary users (SUs) to earn extra revenue. For PUs, the more spectrum that is sold to SUs, the more revenue will be made from spectrum leasing. However, they will suffer quality-of-service (QoS) degradation for their primary service. SUs have their spectrum demands. They buy spectrum by taking into account the service satisfaction and cost in terms of payment. The profit of PUs and SUs is directly related to the bandwidth proportional allocation and price charging through a spectrum broker. PUs compete with each other to offer spectrum leasing, and SUs compete for spectrum sharing. We model this scenario as a noncooperative game and analyze it by exploring the properties of Nash equilibrium point. We discuss the two cases under complete and incomplete information assumptions. The simulation results demonstrate that our theoretic analysis is sound and accurate.