By Topic

Research on post-bidding bundle strategy for online reverse auction

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$33 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Hu Da-yong ; School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, P.R. China, 150001 ; Feng Yu-qiang

Currently online reverse auction (e-RA) is often used in procurement. However, winner determination problem (WDP) is NP-hard problem and practical use is difficult. As a research focus, `bundling' is an effective way to cut down the complexity of WDP for e-RA, and often applied in practice. Although there are some qualitative researches in this field, quantitative bundling is still a problem. This paper designs post-bidding bundle strategy (PBBS) for e-RA to focus on this issue. Based on mathematical model and the bidding data from suppliers, this strategy uses `item similarity' and `market competitiveness' to measure the possibility of two items in the same bundle. Specially, item similarity measure refers to two classic methods in scientometrics: Salton and Jaccard. Finally, as shown with the 7th pharmaceutical centralized purchasing bidding data in china, this strategy of bundling has good theoretical value and practical significance in quantitative bundling.

Published in:

Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2010 International Conference on

Date of Conference:

24-26 Nov. 2010