Scheduled System Maintenance on May 29th, 2015:
IEEE Xplore will be upgraded between 11:00 AM and 10:00 PM EDT. During this time there may be intermittent impact on performance. We apologize for any inconvenience.
By Topic

A game theoretic approach to MAC design for infrastructure networks

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

3 Author(s)
Tinnirello, I. ; DIEET, Univ. di Palermo, Palermo, Italy ; Giarre, L. ; Neglia, G.

Wireless network operation intrinsically assumes different forms of cooperation among the network nodes, such as sharing a common wireless medium without interfering, relaying frames belonging to other nodes, controlling the transmission power for optimizing spectrum reuse, coding cooperatively multiple frames for improving information redundancy, and so on. For this reason, Game Theory has been extensively employed to model wireless networks. In particular, we propose a game-theoretic approach for defining a generalized medium access protocol for slotted contention-based channels. Contention-based channels are largely adopted in data networks, e.g. in WiFi and WiMax networks and in some emerging cellular standards. We assume that each node of the network acts as a decision maker or player, and implements a best response strategy on the basis of simple estimators of the network status. When stations are interested in both uploading and downloading traffic, we show that efficient equilibria conditions can be reached. More interesting, these equilibria are reached when all the stations play the same strategy, thus guaranteeing a fair resource sharing. For infrastructure networks, we also propose to exploit the role of the base station to incentive the nodes to operate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium and achieve global optimality and fair performance.

Published in:

Decision and Control (CDC), 2010 49th IEEE Conference on

Date of Conference:

15-17 Dec. 2010