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Inspection on project superviser by real estate developer based on game theory

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2 Author(s)
Cheng Zheng ; Bus. Sch., HoHai Univ., Nanjing, China ; Tao Duan

The rent-seeking activities can severely deteriorate the quality of projects, increase the operation cost of developers and undermine regular market order. Therefore developers should inspect them to avoid supervisers' rent-seeking activities. This paper applies the game theory approach to analyze the problem. Firstly, this paper provides the expected utility functions of a project superviser and a developer, also establishes the game model and solves the equilibriums. Finally, this paper analyzes the influencing factors of a supervisor's rent-seeking activities and brings some countermeasures of inspection on supervisers according to the results of equilibrium analysis.

Published in:

Management Science and Industrial Engineering (MSIE), 2011 International Conference on

Date of Conference:

8-11 Jan. 2011