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Research of service outsourcing in incomplete contracts governance

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2 Author(s)
Yang Yihua ; Department of Rail lines, Guangzhou Institute of Railway Technology, China ; Chen Juhong

The important reason for the failure of service outsourcing activities is that bilateral cooperation contract can not effectively prevented the various risk factors arising from information asymmetry. To this problem, agent relationships in incomplete contract governance was studied in this paper in the process of service outsourcing, the results showed that customers can save more incentive costs in incomplete contract conditions compared to that of official contracts.

Published in:

Information Science and Engineering (ICISE), 2010 2nd International Conference on

Date of Conference:

4-6 Dec. 2010