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Cache-to-Cache: Could ISPs Cooperate to Decrease Peer-to-Peer Content Distribution Costs?

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1 Author(s)
Dan, G. ; Lab. for Commun. Networks, KTH (R. Inst. of Technol.), Stockholm, Sweden

We consider whether cooperative caching may reduce the transit traffic costs of Internet service providers (ISPs) due to peer-to-peer (P2P) content distribution systems. We formulate two game-theoretic models for cooperative caching, one in which ISPs follow their selfish interests, and one in which they act altruistically. We show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for both games, and evaluate the gains of cooperation on various network topologies, among them the AS level map of Northern Europe, using measured traces of P2P content popularity. We find that cooperation can lead to significant improvements of the cache efficiency with little communication overhead even if ISPs follow their selfish interests.

Published in:

Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on  (Volume:22 ,  Issue: 9 )