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A Bargaining Game for Channel Access in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

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2 Author(s)
Brahma, S. ; Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., Univ. of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA ; Chatterjee, M.

In this paper, we model the problem of dynamic spectrum access by a set of cognitive radio enabled nodes as an infinite horizon bargaining game. Each node (or, player) negotiates with its interfering nodes to obtain an agreeable sharing rule of the available channels. We investigate the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the bargaining game, abiding by which, each node can maximize its throughput against all its interfering nodes (opponents). We further study the issue of fairness in this model, in terms of the relative number of channels allocated to the nodes. Moreover, each node bargains with its interfering neighbors independently and in a distributed manner, making the system scalable.

Published in:

Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM 2010), 2010 IEEE

Date of Conference:

6-10 Dec. 2010