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Methodologies for evaluating game theoretic defense against DDoS attacks

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4 Author(s)
Khirwadkar, T. ; Coordinated Sci. Lab., Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA ; Nguyen, K.C. ; Nicol, D.M. ; Basar, T.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on the Internet are used by attackers to be a nuisance, make a political statement (e.g. the 2009 attack against Estonia), or as a weapon of an Internet extortionist. Effective defense against these is a crucial study area, where advanced simulation techniques play a critical role, because of the enormous number of events involved. This paper considers a methodology for evaluating a game-theoretic defense against DDoS. We first describe a basic form of the defense, note the performance limitations suffered by a naive implementation, and then consider methodologies in which a parallelized approach may accelerate performance.

Published in:

Simulation Conference (WSC), Proceedings of the 2010 Winter

Date of Conference:

5-8 Dec. 2010